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The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional 
Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the 
Adoption of National-Standard Rules†
By Michael Frakes*
I explore the association between regional variations in physician 
behavior and the geographical scope of malpractice standards of 
care. I estimate a 30–50 percent reduction in the gap between state 
and national utilization rates of various treatments and diagnostic 
procedures following the adoption of a rule requiring physicians 
to follow national, as opposed to local, standards. These findings 
suggest that standardization in malpractice law may lead to greater 
standardization in practices and, more generally, that physicians may 
indeed adhere to specific liability standards. In connection with the 
estimated convergence in practices, I observe no associated changes 
in patient health. (JEL I11, I18, J44, K13)
A large literature in health economics and medicine has explored the regional 
practice patterns of physicians and other medical providers and has endeavored to 
understand (i) why some regions spend so much in the care of patients relative 
to other regions and (ii) whether high-spending regions generate superior health 
outcomes. In this paper, I explore a potential contribution to the observed disparities 
in care that has been suggested by leading theoretical scholars in the area-variations 
literature (Phelps 1992), but that has yet to be explored empirically: laws respecting 
the geographical nature of the standards of care employed in medical malpractice 
actions. In addition to shedding potentially valuable light on each of the above puz-
zles, this investigation may, at the same time, offer novel insight into the fundamen-
tal question of whether physicians are responsive to the specific standards expected 
of them under the law.
A common thread that emerges throughout those studies that have endeavored 
to explore the causes behind the regional variations phenomenon is the inability 
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to explain a substantial portion of the observed variation in medical practices.1 
Accounting for various socioeconomic and other factors, Baicker, Buckles, 
and Chandra (2006), for instance, are unable to explain about 40 percent of the 
regional variation in cesarean utilization rates across US counties. Interestingly, 
they do find that 14.8 percent of the cesarean variation is explained by certain 
measures of regional malpractice intensity, including the frequency and severity 
of malpractice awards. Those rare regional-variations studies that have addressed 
the role of medical liability, however, have overlooked those geographical com-
ponents of malpractice law that may be most relevant to a discussion of regional 
practice patterns.
While tort law typically sets operable standards of care by determining what 
a “reasonable” person would do under similar circumstances, malpractice law 
generally sets standards by determining what physicians actually do. To deter-
mine what these customary standards are, traditional malpractice law turned to 
the behavior of physicians practicing in the same locality as the defendant. That 
is, physicians were expected to follow the practices applied by those around them. 
The application of such “locality” rules could reasonably lead to the perpetuation 
of divergent regional practice patterns. I explore this possibility by estimating 
whether procedure utilization rates in a state that uses a local standard rule con-
verge towards the relevant national rates when the state amends its malpractice 
laws to require that physicians comply with national standards of care. Since the 
1960s and 1970s, the majority of states have amended their substantive malprac-
tice laws to adopt such national rules.
Online Appendix A provides more details on the evolution of malpractice stan-
dard rules. I document 16 states that abandoned the use of local standards in favor of 
national standards in the post-1977 period,2 along with 1 additional state (Maryland) 
that retreated from a previous national-standard adoption. Sixteen states currently 
retain some element of locality in their standard-of-care laws.
Focusing on obstetric and cardiac practices, I find evidence of regional conver-
gence in the utilization rates of the targeted treatments and diagnostic procedures 
upon the abandonment of a locality rule. For instance, in the case of cesarean deliv-
eries, I find evidence consistent with a convergence effect in which 40 percent of 
the gap between state and national utilization rates is closed in connection with the 
adoption of a national-standard rule.
This regional convergence analysis also affords an opportunity to confront the 
second major question raised by the regional variations phenomenon: where along 
the regional distribution of practices does the optimum lie? Embracing an arguably 
exogenous source of variation in within-state treatment rates, I find evidence that is 
generally consistent with a “flat-of-the-curve” story, suggesting that reductions in 
the investigated treatment rates may be achieved with little detriment to associated 
health outcomes (e.g., neonatal mortality).
1 Prominent examples include Phelps and Mooney (1993), Wennberg and Cooper (1999), and Cutler and 
Sheiner (1999).
2 Such states include New Mexico (1978), Nevada (1979), Alabama (1980), Washington, DC (1980), South 
Carolina (1981), Wyoming (1981), Colorado (1983), Mississippi (1983), Connecticut (1984), Oklahoma 
(1984), Montana (1985), West Virginia (1986), South Dakota (1988), Indiana (1992), Rhode Island (1998), and 
Delaware (1999).
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The numerous ambiguities surrounding the deterrent channel of malpractice lia-
bility have, in part, motivated a larger literature exploring the relationship between 
physician behavior and malpractice law. To date, empirical investigations into any 
such relationship have focused on evaluating the impact of malpractice laws that 
operate by reducing the expected consequences of medical liability—e.g., caps 
on noneconomic damages (see, for example, Kessler and McClellan 1996). These 
remedial-focused studies overlook another way in which malpractice laws may be 
amended in order to shape behavior: varying the manner in which the alleged actions 
of physicians are deemed to trigger liability in the first instance (Blumstein 2006). 
While the convergence analysis tells a specific story regarding the impact of the 
geographical components of standard-of-care rules, the convergence findings may 
also offer a more general contribution by demonstrating the empirical relevancy of 
legal standards of care themselves.3
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the impact on physician behav-
ior of malpractice-standard rules. Sections II and III describe the data and empiri-
cal methodology. Section IV presents results of the utilization and health outcomes 
analyses. Section V concludes.
I. Impact of Malpractice-Standard Rules
Treatment utilization rates followed by local physicians may, in part, be a reflec-
tion of their idiosyncratic beliefs regarding optimal practices (Wennberg 1984). 
Divergence in beliefs (and thus divergence in behaviors) may perpetuate over time 
under an assumption that physicians prefer local sources of information (Phelps and 
Mooney 1993). Malpractice “locality rules” may solidify these pathways by endors-
ing local belief structures and by discouraging the evolution of practices. This paper 
effectively explores whether the abandonment of a locality rule will break these 
isolating forces and thereby allow or encourage physicians to deviate from the pres-
ent set of divergent customs. Moreover, considering that, upon the abandonment of 
such rules, physicians in the affected jurisdictions now face expectations to follow 
the customary behaviors followed by physicians nationally, the essential hypothesis 
tested in this paper is that the practices of those affected physicians will indeed con-
form to the practices applied in other regions.
Two mechanisms may underlie a physician’s response to this change in 
malpractice-standard laws: (i) an informational mechanism and (ii) an incentive 
mechanism. First, while customary locality rules may reinforce the limited informa-
tion sets that are, in part, responsible for regional practice patterns, the adoption of 
a national-standard rule may expose local physicians to information that challenges 
their priors. By flowing through the liability system, this information source may be 
salient enough to induce physicians to update these priors and revise their behavior 
to be in greater accord with the rest of the country.
3 While no studies to date have directly explored the relationship between the locality rule and physician behav-
ior, several have found evidence consistent with a positive relationship between malpractice claims severity and 
frequency and the adoption of laws requiring the use of broader geographical standards (Waters et al. 2007; Adams 
and Zuckerman 1984; and Danzon 1984). While these results are not determinative of the manner in which physi-
cians will respond to an abandonment of the locality rule, they nonetheless support an argument that a change in 
malpractice standard laws alters the expectations being placed upon physicians.
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Moreover, following the change in legal regime, physicians may face liability 
risks to the extent that their local practices deviate from the national standard. The 
channels by which physicians respond to a shift in standards may be reflective of 
both changes in liability fears over improperly addressing the underlying condi-
tion and changes in fears over improperly executing the associated treatment. For 
instance, consider an initially low-intensity treatment area. Following a national-
standard adoption, the law may call for a more intensive treatment regime. This 
may be due, in part, to a heightening of previously low standards regarding when 
treatment should be employed under a given set of clinical circumstances, which 
may push physicians to increase treatment utilizations in order to avoid liability. The 
change in law may also amount to a reduction of previously high standards regard-
ing the execution of the treatment, which may give physicians more freedom to 
explore treatment options for certain patients and likewise induce them to increase 
their utilization rates.
Similar mechanisms may drive physician behavior in initially high-intensity treat-
ment areas. These mechanisms may not operate symmetrically on both ends of the 
regional utilization distribution, however. As such, in some empirical specifications, 
I allow for differential responses from each side.
II. Data
Data on physician behavior is from the 1977 to 2005 National Hospital Discharge 
Survey (NHDS) files, each of which provides a sample of inpatient discharge 
records from short-stay, nonfederal hospitals. The NHDS offers comprehensive uti-
lization data covering a long enough period of time to take advantage of the rich set 
of reforms that occurred from the 1970s to the 1990s.
The analysis below focuses on two types of care that are less susceptible to the 
limitations of the NHDS—primarily, the lack of outpatient records—and that are 
common subjects of the medical malpractice4 and regional variations5 literatures: 
obstetrics and complex cardiac care. Online Appendix B provides further details on 
the construction of the resulting sample and of the relevant procedure rates, in addi-
tion to the rationale behind the selection of the targeted procedures.
Obstetric Utilization Measures.—This study places particular emphasis on the 
decision to deliver a child via cesarean section. The primary specifications base the 
dependent variable on state-year cesarean rates that are risk-adjusted for mater-
nal age and race and for the incidence of breech presentation, multiple delivery, 
or previous cesarean delivery. Cesareans are heavily performed in the presence 
of these latter risk factors, implicating a concern that the within-state variation 
in cesarean rates in the NHDS sample may be too sensitive to variations in the 
incidence of these relatively nondiscretionary circumstances (discussed further in 
4 See, for example, Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Kessler and McClellan (1996).
5 See, for example, Chandra and Staiger (2007) and Baicker, Buckles, and Chandra (2006).
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online Appendix C).6 I also consider specifications that test for convergence in the 
rates of vaginal births after previous cesarean deliveries.7
Cardiac: Treatment Measures.—Next, I consider the care administered to patients 
with coronary artery disease. I model this care as a choice between no interven-
tion and intensive intervention, as represented by the use of coronary artery bypass 
grafts (CABG) or percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasties (PTCA). 
Alternatively, I include cardiac catheterizations on this list, treating catheterizations 
as a marker for intensive care (Chandra and Staiger 2007).
Cardiac: Diagnostic Measures.—Diagnostic utilization has been found to be par-
ticularly sensitive to malpractice pressures.8 The use of inpatient-only data sources, 
however, represents an especially sensitive problem for an analysis of the factors con-
tributing to diagnostic utilization, an area of care with a considerable outpatient com-
ponent. I take two approaches in surmounting these difficulties. First, I focus on the 
subsample of patients admitted with a primary diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction 
(AMI) and consider the use of either of the following diagnostic tools: cardiac cath-
eterizations or echocardiograms.9 This approach softens sample selection concerns 
that might arise from the lack of outpatient records, given that heart attacks represent a 
situation in which affected patients will almost always seek hospitalization. Second, I 
consider a utilization rate of cardiac catheterizations across all patients—i.e., not sim-
ply primary-AMI patients. Relative to other diagnostic procedures, catheterizations 
are particularly invasive and are frequently performed in an inpatient setting. They are 
thus arguably amendable to an analysis that relies only on inpatient records.10
Descriptive Statistics.—Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations for 
the key variables employed in the analysis below.
III. Empirical Methodology
A. Utilization Specifications
To explore whether physicians begin to follow the practices applied nationally 
upon the adoption of a national-standard rule, I test whether state utilization rates 
for the procedures indicated above converge towards their respective national mean 
6 Online Appendix B provides further details on the rationale behind this construction. Those specifications that 
use a sample of individual deliveries base the dependent variable on the incidence of cesarean delivery and include 
controls for these highly determinative risk factors. In alternative specifications estimated in online Appendix C, 
I follow the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s definition of a “primary” cesarean rate, which excludes 
deliveries with those same highly determinative risk factors from the cesarean rate calculation.
7 To lessen sample selection concerns arising from the fact that the sample used here (cesareans) changes in com-
position in association with national-standard rules, I risk-adjust the rates of vaginal births after cesarean delivery 
for a range of risk factors (see online Appendix B).
8 See, for example, Baicker, Fisher, and Chandra (2007).
9 These measures represent the most common invasive and noninvasive diagnostic tools, respectively, used on 
primary AMI patients in the NHDS sample. The area variations literature often invokes cardiac catheterization as 
the representative example of a diagnostic imaging procedure. See, for example, Wennberg and Cooper (1999).
10 In calculating general cardiac catheterization rates, I scale state-year catheterization counts by the total num-
ber of AMIs in the state-year cell.
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rates as states adopt such rules. For the purposes of illustration, I demonstrate the 
empirical methodology for the case of the cesarean delivery decision. I begin by 
estimating the following specification, weighting each observation by the number of 
deliveries in each state-year cell:
(1) CS_GA P s,t = α +  γ s +  λ t +  φ s,t +  β 1 N S s, t +  β 2 N S s,t+2 
 +  β 3  X s, t +  β 4  Z s, t +  β 5  O s, t +  ε s, t ,
where s indexes state and t indexes year; NSs, t represents an indicator for a national-
standard law; Xs, t represents mean incidence rates within the NHDS delivery 
subsample of various maternal and hospital characteristics;11 and Zs, t represents 
11 Such characteristics include: mother’s age (15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, and 40+ years old); mother’s 
race (white, black, and other); mother’s insurance status (private, government, no insurance, and other); hospital 
Table 1—Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
Mean
Percentage absolute 
deviation between state 
and national mean
(1) (2)
National standard-of-care law 62.93
(48.32)
—
Cesarean section rate 
 (standardized, percent)
22.32
(4.87)
10.08
(9.47)
Vaginal birth after cesarean rate 
 (percent)
20.40
(13.75)
36.52
(47.69)
Cardiac treatment rate: CABG or PTCA 
 (normalized by state-year AMI count)
0.94
(0.57)
41.49
(36.44)
Cardiac treatment rate: CABG, PTCA, or cardiac cath. 
 (normalized by state-year AMI count) 
1.83
(0.81)
31.94
(32.21)
Cardiac cath. rate 
 (normalized by state-year AMI count) 
1.50
(0.68)
31.93
(33.80)
Rate of cardiac cath. or echocardiogram within primary
 AMI subsample (percent)
41.09
(18.66)
26.23
(29.21)
Rate of cardiac cath. within primary AMI subsample
 (percent)
35.70
(19.15)
34.56
(33.25)
Five-minute Apgar score 8.97
(0.13)
0.85
(0.88)
“Good” five-minute Apgar score 
 (percent)
98.4
(0.40)
0.23
(0.23)
28 day neonatal mortality rate 
 (per 100 live births)
0.65
(0.22)
16.86
(16.17)
Predicted probability of cesarean 
Delivery (cesarean sample, percent)
61.64
(6.88)
—
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Treatment utilization measures are from a sample of 1,230 state-year 
cells from the 1977–2005 NHDS files. The national-standard measure is calculated over the same set of state-year cells. 
Five-minute Apgar scores and neonatal mortality rates are from the 1978–2004 Natality Detail files and the 1977–2004 
Vital Statistics Mortality files, respectively. The predicted cesarean probability measure is from the 1979–2005 NHDS 
files. Statistics are weighted by the relevant number of deliveries associated with each state-year cell (obstetric mea-
sures) or the relevant number of primary AMI discharges associated with each cell (cardiac measures).
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certain additional state-year factors.12 State fixed effects, γs, and year fixed effects, 
λt , control for fixed differences across states and across years, respectively. State-
specific linear time trends are captured by  φ s,t , which control for slowly moving 
correlations between physician behavior in a state and the adoption of a national-
standard law. Controls for the presence of the following tort reforms are included 
in  O s, t : damage caps (noneconomic, punitive, and total), collateral source–rule 
reforms, and other “indirect” reforms, a residual category that is specified accord-
ing to Kessler and McClellan (1996).13 Representing a measure of closeness 
between state and national cesarean rates, CS_GA P s, t is calculated as the absolute 
value of the difference between the state and national cesarean rate, normalized 
by the national rate.14
The coefficient of interest is represented by β1, which identifies the extent to which 
the adoption of a national-standard law is associated with a convergence between 
state and national behavior. Of course, the specified dependent variable may also 
capture sources of mean revision in regional cesarean rates, which poses a concern 
that β1 spuriously reflects a differential level of mean revision between treatment 
and control states. I test for this possibility by including a “lead” of the national-
standard indicator, NSs, t+2, in the base specifications. This variable indicates, at time 
t, a state’s national-standard status at time t + 2. A negative estimate for  β 2 would 
suggest that the convergence associated with such laws emerged in the period lead-
ing up to their adoptions and thus may not be reflective of a true policy response. In 
other specifications, I estimate an even more dynamic specification that includes a 
range of lead indicator variables.15
The above approach parameterizes convergence in behavior through the con-
struction of the dependent variable. In an alternative approach, I specify the 
dependent variable as the individual incidence of cesarean delivery and capture 
malpractice-induced convergence by specifying a modified national-standard 
variable, MOD_NS, that switches (i ) from 0 to 1 upon the adoption of a national-
standard law for those states that begin with standardized cesarean rates below the 
national average (and for which the adoption is hypothesized to lead to an increase 
in utilization); and (ii ) from 1 to 0 upon the adoption of a national-standard law 
for those states that begin with above-average rates (and for which the adoption is 
bed size (0–100, 100–200, 200–300, 300–500, and 500+ beds); and hospital ownership type (proprietary, nonprofit, 
and government).
12 These characteristics include the prevailing OB/GYN concentration rates and fertility rates. Data on physician 
population counts are from the American Medical Association administrative records and were obtained from the 
Area Resource File (ARF). Fertility rates are calculated according to Gruber and Owings (1996) as the number of 
births per population and come from the Vital Statistics Natality files (also obtained via the ARF).
13 For example, an “indirect” reform includes a limitation on joint and several liability. Data on tort reforms is 
from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms (2nd) compiled by Ronen Avraham.
14 In calculating this dependent variable for each state and year, the national rate is adjusted accordingly to 
remove the contribution of the NHDS records from the relevant state-year cell.
15 I follow Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) in testing for differential trends in the preadoption period through 
the estimation of specifications that include a single preperiod lead indicator, along with dynamic specifications 
that include several preperiod leads. In those that include just one lead, I follow Gruber and Hungerman (2008) in 
observing behavior in the two-year period leading up to the reform, providing enough time to sufficiently assess 
prereform treatment rates.
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hypothesized to lead to a decrease in utilization).16 Accordingly, I estimate the fol-
lowing specification using the full sample of individual deliveries:
(2)  U i, s, t =  α +  γ s +  λ t +  φ s, t +  β 1  X i, s, t +  β 2  Z s, t +  β 3  O s, t 
 +  β 4 MOD_N S s, t +  β 5 MOD_N S s, t+2 +  ε i, s, t ,
where  X i, s, t now represents the individual incidence of the various maternal and hos-
pital characteristics;  U i, s, t indicates a cesarean delivery for individual i in state s and 
year t. A convergent response to the adoption of a national-standard law is identified 
by a positive estimate of the coefficient of the modified indicator.17
Each of the above specifications allows simultaneously for convergence to occur 
from both ends of the regional utilization distribution. I also consider a set of speci-
fications that estimate separate physician responses for each side of this distribution, 
thereby relaxing any assumption of symmetry. In a final approach, which likewise 
does not assume a symmetrical response, I estimate the following:
(3)  U i,s,t =  α +  γ s +  λ t +  φ s, t +  β 1  X i, s, t +  β 2  Z s, t +  β 3  O s, t 
 +  β 4 BELO W s +  β 5 N S s,t +  β 6 BELO W s × N S s, t +  ε i, s, t ,
where BELOW is an indicator for a state with an initially low cesarean rate. The 
coefficient of  β 5 in this interaction specification can effectively be interpreted as 
the association between national-standard laws and cesarean rates for states with 
initially above-average cesarean rates (i.e., when BELOW = 0). For states with ini-
tially below average rates (BELOW = 1), this same association can effectively be 
captured by the sum of  β 5 and  β 6 . This approach provides an additional way to 
observe the potential two-sided impact of national-standard laws.
B. Health Outcomes Specifications
I next evaluate whether the shifts in treatment rates that result from the adop-
tion of national-standard laws are associated with corresponding shifts in health 
outcomes. In addition to providing an evaluation of the consequences of these adop-
tions, this analysis facilitates a more general exploration into the returns associated 
with increases in the intensity of regional practices.
16 I allocate each treatment state to the relevant group—initially above or initially below the national 
average—based on its relation to the national average in the period leading up to the reform. The sign of the relation-
ship between state and national rates is quite stable throughout the sample. In virtually every treatment state, the state 
cesarean rate remains consistently on one side of the national average from the beginning of the sample period until 
the time of adoption.
17 I estimate this relationship using a linear probability model; however, the results are robust to the use of a logit 
model. To address concerns over small-sample variation in the occurrence of previous-cesarean, breech, or multiple 
deliveries, I control for the incidence of these factors.
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Marginal Appropriateness.—I begin by testing for evidence of regional 
“triage”—i.e., as regions increase their cesarean rates, are the marginal mothers 
receiving cesareans becoming less and less appropriate for cesarean delivery? A 
finding of this nature would be consistent with a story of diminishing returns (in 
patient health) to increases in regional cesarean intensities.
For these purposes, I test, via a selection effect, whether an increase in the propor-
tion of mothers receiving cesareans in a region leads to a reduction in the average 
cesarean-appropriateness level among mothers receiving cesareans in that region. 
The implication of any such negative impact is that the marginal cesarean mothers 
have an increasingly below-average case mix for cesareans in that region—i.e., a 
diminishing need for cesareans. To parameterize the appropriateness level for each 
delivery, I calculate the relevant mother’s predicted probability of receiving a cesar-
ean section, PPCi, s, t , using fitted values of a logit model (estimated annually) of 
the incidence of cesarean delivery on a set of individual risk factors and complica-
tions.18 I then estimate the following:
(4) MEAN_CS_PP C s,t =  α +  γ s +  λ t +  φ s, t + ζ ln (CS_RAT E s, t )
 +  β 1  X s, t +  β 2  Z s, t +  β 3  O s, t +  ε s, t ,
where γs , λt , φs, t ,  X s, t ,  Z s, t , and  O s, t are defined as in specification (1) above; 
MEAN_CS_PP C s,t represents the average of the individual predicted cesarean prob-
abilities, PPCi, s, t , among the cesareans performed in state s in year t. The natural log 
of the area cesarean rate is represented by ln (CS_RAT E s, t ).19
The estimated coefficient of the logged cesarean rate, ζ, allows for a test of the 
presence of regional triage in cesarean practices. As suggested by Gruber, Levine, 
and Staiger (1999), this estimate also identifies the magnitude of the gap between 
the PPC of the marginal cesarean mother and that of the average cesarean mother. 
To account for endogeneity concerns,20 I estimate the above specification using 
two-stage least squares (2SLS), instrumenting the state-year cesarean rate with the 
modified national-standard law, which, as above, is constructed so as to identify an 
increase in cesarean rates upon its adoption.21
Average Neonatal Outcomes.—While evidence of triage may be suggestive of 
diminishing returns to regional cesarean intensities, this evidence alone does not 
18 This approach follows Baicker, Buckles, and Chandra (2006) and Chandra and Staiger (2007). The set of risk 
factors and complications used in this calculation are listed in online Appendix B.
19 To alleviate concerns over state-year shocks in the incidence of the various risk factors comprising the PPC 
calculation (which may otherwise confound the identification of the intended selection effect), I follow Chandra 
and Staiger (2007) and risk-adjust CS_RATEs, t for the state-year incidences of such factors (in addition to risk-
adjusting for maternal age and race).
20 While the ordinary least squares estimates account for fluctuations in the incidence of the relevant risk factors, 
an instrumental variables approach may nonetheless appease residual concerns that cesarean rates are correlated 
with unobservable determinants of the case mix of cesarean mothers. For instance, if medical or technological capa-
bilities improve within a state, this could impact both the intensive treatment rate followed and the level and quality 
of preventive care received by patients, which could generally impact their case mix upon delivery.
21 Similar results are derived when estimating separate 2SLS specifications for initially below-average cesarean 
states and initially above-average cesarean states and using unmodified national-standard indicators as the instru-
ment. The utilization analysis below confirms the validity of the first-stage relationship between national-standard 
laws and cesarean rates.
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indicate that regions have exhausted those returns. As such, I next explore whether 
the changes in regional cesarean rates resulting from national-standard laws are 
associated with corresponding changes in average delivery outcomes. This latter 
approach is of course limited by the availability of data on relevant health out-
comes, which are focused on mortality-related measures. Emphasizing the clinical 
appropriateness for cesarean delivery, the triage analysis, on the other hand, offers 
insight that is potentially suggestive (though indirectly) of the relationship between 
cesarean rates and a broader range of health outcomes.
For the purposes of a direct outcomes analysis, I estimate a specification analo-
gous to that of equation (1) and test whether the adoption of national-standard laws 
are associated with a convergence in state neonatal outcome means toward national 
means.22 To the extent that cesarean rates are associated with average health out-
comes, it would be reasonable to expect that any convergence in cesarean rates 
stemming from national-standard laws would be accompanied by a convergence in 
regional means of various neonatal outcomes. 23 The outcome measures investigated 
include five-minute infant Apgar scores24 and 28-day neonatal mortality rates. Data 
on neonatal outcomes are from the 1978–2004 Natality Data and the 1977–2004 
Mortality Data, each from the National Vital Statistics System.
IV. Results
A. Utilization Analysis
Cesarean Results: Aggregated State-Year Specifications.—Panel A of Table 2 
presents results for the cesarean specifications indicated in equation (1) above.25 I 
find that a state’s abandonment of a locality rule and adoption of a national-standard 
rule is associated with a 4.1 percentage point reduction in the absolute percentage 
deviation between the state’s standardized cesarean rate and the national rate (col-
umn 1). This estimate amounts to a roughly 40 percent reduction in the gap between 
the state and national rate. The estimated coefficient of the national-standard dummy 
remains nearly unchanged (with slight increases in absolute magnitude) with the 
inclusion of state-year controls (column 2), covariate tort laws (column 3)26, and 
state-specific linear time trends (column 4).
22 The health outcomes specifications include state-year demographic controls for the means of various age, 
race, and education categories from the mothers included in the Natality records, in addition to controls for the area 
fertility rate and OB/GYN concentration rate and for the average hospital bed sizes per population of the state-year 
cell (each of which are obtained from the ARF).
23 I do not present results from an instrumental-variables specification analogous to that of the triage analysis, 
given the lack of a data source with consistent measures of both cesarean rates and neonatal outcomes over a period 
of time long enough to capture sufficient variation in national-standard laws (cesareans are only identified in the 
Natality files in the post-1988 period).
24 Given on a scale from 0 to 10, Apgar tests are designed to assess the health of a newborn infant and to deter-
mine the need for resuscitative efforts.
25 Results are presented in percentage terms. All coefficients and standard errors presented in the regression 
tables are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary within-state cor-
relations of the error structure (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
26 The addition of the covariate tort laws changes the coefficient from −4.67 to −4.64, demonstrating the insensitiv-
ity of the findings to the incidence of additional tort laws. The correlation coefficient between the national-standard 
indicator and the additional tort laws is as follows: noneconomic damage caps (0.02), total damage caps (0.01), puni-
tive damage caps (−0.04), collateral source rule reforms (−0.19), and the indirect tort law indicator (0.24).
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The estimated convergence associated with national-standard adoptions is of 
roughly the same size as the underlying level of convergence observed over the 
entire 28-year sample period for the nontreated sample (the sample of control states 
and preadoption years from treatment states). 27 This suggests that it is unlikely that 
the estimated impact of national-standard laws is merely reflective of a spurious 
mean-reversion differential between treatment and control states.28
In further support of this point, I find that in each of columns 1–4 of Table 2, the 
estimated coefficient of the two-year lead indicator for the adoption of a national-
standard law is statistically insignificant and nearly 0 in magnitude— e.g., 0.10 in 
column 4. Similarly, in columns 1–4 of Table 6, I estimate a richer dynamic speci-
fication that includes one-, two-, and three-year lead indicators. The coefficient of 
each such lead indicator is small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable 
from 0. Moreover, as indicated by the p-value of the F-statistics reported in Table 6, 
the lead coefficients are collectively indistinguishable from 0. As such, there is no 
27 Dividing the nontreated sample into six periods, each representing five-year increments, I find that the per-
centage absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates is, relative to the first period, lower in the 
second-sixth periods by 1.64, 2.79, 1.33, 3.02, and 4.43 percentage points. Between the first and last actual sample 
years, this spread is slightly larger at 6 percentage points.
28 Less confidence would likely be had, for instance, if the estimated 4 percentage-point reduction in the dependent 
variable following national-standard adoptions represented the difference between an average convergence of 20 per-
centage points in treatment states and an average convergence of 16 percentage points in control states.
Table 2—Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Percentage Absolute Deviation 
between State and National Obstetric Treatment Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Dependent variable: percentage absolute deviation between state and national cesarean rates (standardized)
Coefficient of national-standard law dummy
Two-year lead dummy −0.14
(3.82)
−0.41
(3.20)
−0.59
(3.12)
0.10
(2.40) −
Contemporaneous dummy −4.09*
(2.17)
−4.67**
(2.26)
−4.64*
(2.33)
−4.91**
(1.91)
−4.87***
(1.47)
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,215
Panel B. Dependent variable: percentage absolute deviation between state and national VBAC (standardized) rates
Coefficient of national-standard law dummy
Two-year lead dummy −0.45
(14.30)
2.22
(11.46)
1.43
(11.16)
6.00
(6.16) −
Contemporaneous dummy −18.52*
(10.61)
−12.12
(11.13)
−11.05
(9.21)
−13.90
(10.41)
−11.49
(8.84)
Observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191
State-year controls? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional tort laws? No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific linear trends? No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of deliveries used to form the cesar-
ean utilization rate denominators (panel A) or the number of previous cesarean deliveries used to form the VBAC 
utilization rate denominators (panel B). Utilization data is from the NHDS.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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evidence to suggest that the estimated convergence in regional cesarean rates mate-
rialized in the preadoption period.
Figure 1 plots results from a dynamic specification that includes one-, two-, three-, 
and four-year lead and one-, two-, three-, and four-year lagged dummy variables 
for the incidence of a national-standard law. The plotted line reflects a time trend 
of the differential between treatment and control states in the percentage absolute 
deviation between state and national cesarean rates, where time is not measured 
in calendar years but instead with reference to the point of adoption of national-
standard laws. This figure provides no evidence to suggest that the negative effect 
of national-standard rules emerged in the preadoption period. This effect, however, 
does emerge relatively soon following their adoption and intensifies slightly (in 
aggregation) over time.
In online Appendix C, I demonstrate the robustness of the above findings to a range 
of specification checks, including the use of a randomization inference approach, 
the systematic one-by-one dropping of each treatment state from the specification, 
and the inclusion of certain additional covariates (e.g., HMO penetration rates). 
As a falsification exercise, I also demonstrate the lack of a relationship between 
national-standard laws and convergence in the rates of various nondiscretionary 
medical events (e.g., AMI admissions) with respect to which one would not expect 
a sensitivity to the prevailing legal regime.
Cesarean Results: Individual Delivery Specifications.—In columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 3, I estimate a positive relationship between the incidence of cesarean deliv-
ery and the adoption of a national-standard law for those states with initially low 
Figure 1. Dynamic Cesarean Specification Results
Notes: This graph presents regression results from a specification that includes four-, three-, two-, and one-year 
lagged dummies and four-, three-, two-, and one-year lead dummies for national-standard rules. Each point draws 
on the estimated coefficients and reflects the change over time in the percentage absolute deviation between state 
and national cesarean rates, where time is defined with reference to the years prior to and subsequent to national-
standard adoptions. The period of time prior to the fourth year before such adoptions represents the reference group 
(with a value set at 0). The specifications include the full set of state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-specific 
linear time trends, and state-year controls. Cesarean data is from the NHDS.
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 cesarean rates and a corresponding negative relationship for those states with ini-
tially high rates.29 As such, I find evidence consistent with a two-sided convergent 
effect.30 In column 3, I estimate the specification indicated in equation (3), which 
effectively combines the approaches of columns 1 and 2. These findings suggest that 
for states with initially above average cesarean rates (BELOW = 0), national-stan-
dard laws are associated with a 1.9 percentage point reduction in cesarean rates. The 
coefficient of the interaction term suggests that this association is 2.8 percentage 
points higher for initially low-intensity areas, in which case national-standard laws 
are associated with a roughly 0.9 percentage-point increase in cesarean rates for such 
areas. These results are likewise consistent with a two-sided convergent response to 
national-standard laws.
29 To provide meaningful comparison groups, I allocate control groups to one of these two sets of states based 
on the sign of the relationship between their cesarean rate and the national average over the first few years of the 
sample, though the results are robust to an approach that includes every control state in each of these separate 
samples. In those specifications that require a division of the sample into states with initially low and initially high 
rates, I exclude discharges from Maryland, which repealed a previously enacted reform. While this repeal may lead 
to a divergence away from the national mean in light of the fact that impacted physicians may no longer be expected 
to comply with changing national practices, there is no firm reason to expect that this divergence will occur in one 
direction over the other. In any event, the results remain essentially unchanged when I include Maryland and assume 
that its cesarean rates will diverge from the national mean in the same direction of its deviation from that mean at 
the time of repeal.
30 These specifications address concerns over state-year shocks in the incidence of those risk factors that 
almost always lead to cesarean deliveries (e.g., breech presentation) by including controls for the individual 
incidence of such factors. I obtain an identical set of results when I include a single control for the individual 
delivery’s predicted probability of cesarean section, which accounts for an even broader array of risk factors. 
Nearly identical results are also obtained from a specification that includes separate controls for each of the risk 
factors involved in the PPC calculation (though these latter approaches exclude 1977 and 1978 given limited risk 
factor data).
Table 3—Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Individual Likelihood  
of Cesarean Delivery
States with 
below-average 
rates
States with 
above-average 
rates
Entire sample of states 
(above and below 
average rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
National-standard (NS) law 
 dummy
1.01*
(0.60) −2.21**(1.04)
−1.90*
(1.00)
— —
NS law × below average state — — 2.75**(1.14)
— —
Modified NS law dummy — — — 1.13**
(0.52)
1.15**
(0.55)
Modified NS law dummy: 
 two-year lead
— — — — −0.04
(0.66)
Observations 203,664 313,985 517,739 517,739 517,739
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and a set of individual controls, state-year controls, and state-specific 
linear time trends. The regression in column 3 also includes a separate dummy variable indicating whether the state 
has an initially below-average cesarean rate (coefficient omitted). Utilization data is from the NHDS.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Finally, in column 4 (which likewise effectively combines the approaches of col-
umns 1 and 2), I estimate the specification indicated in equation (2) above and find 
a roughly one percentage point increase in the incidence of cesarean delivery in 
association with the modified national-standard indicator, which is likewise consis-
tent with a convergent effect in which nearly 40 percent of the average gap between 
state and national cesarean rates is closed upon the abandonment of a substantive 
locality rule. Moreover, consistent with the aggregated state-year specifications, the 
estimated coefficient for the 2 year lead indicator for the modified national-standard 
variable is insignificant and nearly 0 in magnitude.
Vaginal Birth after Cesarean Delivery (VBAC) Results.—Panel B of Table 2 pres-
ents results from the VBAC specifications. In the baseline specification, I estimate 
an 18.5 percentage-point reduction in the percentage absolute deviation between 
state and national VBAC rates (with no corresponding difference in the 2-year pre-
period), consistent with a convergence effect in which roughly 50 percent of the 
state-national gap is closed upon the abandonment of a substantive locality rule. 
This estimate, however, falls slightly in magnitude and loses statistical significance 
upon the addition of covariates and state-specific linear trends.
Cardiac Results.—In Table 4, I explore the relationship between national-stan-
dard laws and regional convergence in cardiac procedure rates. Panels A and B pres-
ent results based on two alternative specifications of intensive cardiac treatments: 
(i) the use of CABG or PTCA and (ii) the use of CABG, PTCA, or cardiac catheter-
ization. In each case, I find evidence of a negative relationship between national-
standard laws and the percentage absolute deviation between state and national 
treatment rates, consistent with a convergence effect in which 30–45 percent of the 
gap between state and national rates is closed upon the change in law, with no indi-
cation that any such effect began in the preadoption period (as demonstrated by the 
estimated “leads” in Tables 4 and 6). Despite stability in the point estimates, the 
precision of the results varies across specifications.
Panels C, D, and E present the results of similar investigations into convergence in 
diagnostic rates. The estimated national-standard coefficients presented in panels C 
and D (which take alternative approaches to the calculation of catheterization rates) 
are consistent with a convergence effect in which roughly 40 percent of the gap 
between state and national cardiac catheterization rates is closed upon the relevant 
change in law. I estimate substantially similar results in panel E, where I explore uti-
lization of either cardiac catheterization (invasive) or echocardiogram (noninvasive) 
within a sample of primary AMI patients.
Finally, in Table 5, I estimate specifications analogous to those of Table 3. For the 
purposes of brevity, I present results for those specifications that identify intensive 
treatments through the use of CABG or PTCA (though the results generalize to 
the other cardiac specifications). Consistent with the cesarean results, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients suggest that the convergence in cardiac rates associated 
with the change in law occurs from both the initially high- and low-intensity ends of 
the regional cardiac treatment distribution. Moreover, as with the cesarean analysis, 
the results of the alternative specifications estimated in columns 3–5, though noisy, 
further suggest a convergent response.
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B. Neonatal Health Outcomes Analysis
I next evaluate the consequences of the regional shifts in utilization documented 
in the above findings. For the purposes of brevity (and in light of the emphasis in the 
utilization analysis), I focus on the cesarean utilization context.31
Marginal Appropriateness.—To evaluate the clinical condition of the marginal 
mothers receiving a cesarean delivery, I estimate the specification indicated in equa-
tion (4) above. In the instrumental-variables specification estimated in panel B of 
Table 7, I find that the marginal cesarean has a predicted probability of cesarean 
section (PPC) that is roughly 25 percentage points lower than that of the average 
31 Allowing for an observation of those who do and do not receive a cesarean, the delivery subsample eas-
ily facilitates an estimation of the clinical appropriateness for surgery. In unreported regressions, I take a similar 
approach in the cardiac context. Lacking a well-contained subsample of those eligible for surgical intervention, 
however, I explore the clinical need for intensive cardiac treatment by observing the incidence of the relevant risk 
factors among the full set of patients in the NHDS records that exceed given ages (e.g., 40 years old, 50 years old, 
etc.). The results of these unreported regressions indicate evidence of triage in cardiac care at the high-intensity end 
of the regional cardiac distribution, with weaker evidence of triage at the low-intensity end.
Table 4—Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Percentage Absolute Deviation 
between State and National Cardiac Procedure Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Treatment: 
 CABG or PTCA
NS law: two-year 
lead dummy
0.67
(8.76) −0.10(8.18)
1.63
(6.84)
0.01
(4.57)
—
Contemporaneous 
dummy
−12.05
(8.40)
−14.68*
(8.64)
−12.68
(8.38)
−11.97
(11.42)
−11.97
(11.63)
Panel B. Treatment: 
 CABG, PTCA, or C. Cath
NS law: two-year 
lead dummy
3.05
(6.33)
1.33
(6.83)
2.57
(5.93)
2.63
(4.17)
—
Contemporaneous 
dummy
−14.07*
(7.46)
−15.87**
(6.05)
−15.39**
(6.06)
−14.52
(8.88)
−13.40
(8.47)
Panel C. Diagnostic: 
 C. Cath (all instances)
NS law: two-year 
lead dummy
2.19
(6.38) −0.70(6.60)
0.55
(5.87) −0.31(4.92)
—
Contemporaneous 
dummy
−11.68
(7.20)
−13.70**
(5.51)
−13.83**
(5.65)
−16.08*
(8.38)
−16.22
(8.25)
Panel D. Diagnostic: 
 C. Cath in AMI sample
NS law: two-year 
lead dummy
−0.51
(11.06)
−4.39
(10.30)
−4.81
(10.97)
−5.76
(17.93)
—
Contemporaneous 
dummy
−12.85
(8.83)
−13.64*
(7.81)
−11.67
(8.10)
−13.59**
(5.51)
−16.04**
(7.52)
Panel E. Diagnostic: C. Cath 
 or echo in AMI sample
NS law: two-year 
lead dummy
4.77
(12.22) −0.89(10.49)
−1.49
(10.81)
0.69
(14.58)
—
Contemporaneous 
dummy
−13.82
(8.36)
−13.18*
(7.59)
−12.65*
(7.45)
−17.09**
(7.08)
−16.79*
(8.55)
State-year controls? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional tort laws? No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific linear trends? No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of primary acute myocardial infarc-
tion discharges in each state-year cell. Utilization data is from the NHDS.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5—Relationship between National-Standard Laws and State Cardiac Procedure  
(CABG or PTCA) Rate Levels
States with 
below-average 
rates
States with 
above-average 
rates
Entire sample of states 
(above and below 
average rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
National-standard (NS) law dummy 16.55(17.22) −18.07*(8.93)
−11.86
(8.07)
— —
NS law × below average state — — 24.99(18.12)
— —
Modified NS law dummy — — — 12.69
(10.77)
13.31
(11.77)
Modified NS law dummy: two-year lead — — — — −1.60
(8.34)
Observations 611 509 1,120 1,120 1,120
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and a set of state-year controls and state-specific linear time trends. 
Regressions are weighted by the number of primary acute myocardial infarction discharges in each state-year cell. 
The regression in column 3 also includes a separate dummy variable indicating whether the state has an initially 
below-average treatment rate (coefficient omitted). Utilization data is from the NHDS.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6—Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Percentage Absolute Deviation 
between State and National Treatment Rates: Dynamic Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coefficient of national-standard law dummy
Three-year lead dummy 0.91
(4.27)
1.39
(3.67)
0.94
(3.55)
2.59
(2.57) −2.98(11.34)
−7.16
(11.64)
−4.95
(10.90)
−3.51
(8.94)
Two-year lead dummy −1.53
(2.53)
−2.05
(2.52)
−1.78
(2.63)
−2.53
(2.63)
0.01
(6.32)
2.85
(7.11)
3.17
(7.13)
1.83
(6.76)
One-year lead dummy 1.80
(3.35)
1.01
(3.40)
0.86
(3.42)
1.64
(3.37)
5.93
(6.45)
5.57
(6.19)
4.77
(5.79)
1.41
(4.90)
Contemporaneous 
 dummy
−4.96**
(2.44)
−5.16*
(2.63)
−5.06*
(2.72)
−5.47**
(2.39)
−14.83
(10.26)
−17.26*
(9.87)
−14.88
(9.63)
−12.84
(11.20)
F-statistic (leads 
 jointly = 0)
0.17 0.22 0.16 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.31 0.08
Prob > F ( p-value) 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.82 0.97
Dependent 
 variable
Percentage absolute deviation 
between state and 
national cesarean rates
Percentage absolute deviation between state 
and national cardiac treatment rates
(CABG or PTCA)
State-year controls? No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Additional tort laws? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
State-specific linear 
 trends?
No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. 
All regressions include state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of deliveries used to form the 
cesarean utilization rate denominators (columns 1–4) or by the number of primary acute myocardial infarction dis-
charges in each state-year cell (columns 5–8). Utilization data is from the NHDS.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 cesarean delivery. As demonstrated by the log-log specification estimated in col-
umn 2, this represents a gap between the average and marginal PPC with a magni-
tude of roughly 43 percent of the average level.
Table 8 presents the corresponding reduced-form results. As presented in 
 column 4, I find that the modified national-standard indicator, which is otherwise 
associated with an increase in cesarean rates, is further associated with a 4 percent-
age-point reduction in the average predicted cesarean probability of the cesarean 
sample. Moreover, consistent with the utilization findings, I find no such associa-
tion in the two-year preadoption period (column 5). The signs of the coefficients 
estimated in column 1 and 2 (bearing in mind the signs of the relationship between 
national-standard rules and cesarean rates) imply that regional triage occurs at both 
ends of the regional cesarean distribution, though likely to a stronger degree at the 
upper end of the distribution (an implication that is further supported by the interac-
tion findings presented in column 3).
These findings suggest that cesarean rates may be at a high enough level that 
the marginal mothers receiving cesareans are considerably less appropriate for this 
intensive delivery method and may thus either benefit less, or risk harm, from the 
intervention.32 Of course, it remains possible that the marginal mothers nonetheless 
benefit somehow from intensive treatment (particularly at the low-intensity end of 
the distribution), leading to gains in average health outcomes. I turn next to an evalu-
ation of these more direct outcome considerations.
32 In online Appendix C, I discuss the robustness of this finding to the consideration of two additional indications 
for cesarean delivery that are not available in the NHDS data but that are available over a shorter time frame in the 
Natality Detail data: low birth weight and preterm delivery.
Table 7—Relationship between Average and Marginal Appropriateness  
for Cesarean Delivery in Cesarean Sample
(1) (2)
Panel A. OLS estimates: effect of the area cesarean rate (logged) on the mean predicted cesarean probability of 
the cesarean sample
Coefficient of ln (cesarean rate) −18.63***
(2.45)
−33.96***
(5.19)
Panel B. 2SLS results: instrumenting the area cesarean rate (logged) with the modified national-standard law dummy
Coefficient of ln(cesarean rate) −24.87***
(9.42)
−43.17***
(16.31)
Dependent variable logged in panels B and C? No Yes
Observations 1,092 1,092
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (corrected for within-state correlation in the error term 
in the case of the OLS regressions). Area cesarean rates are risk-adjusted for age, sex, and the incidence of each of 
the individual risk factors included in the predicted-cesarean-probability calculation. Regressions are weighted by 
the number of cesarean deliveries in each state-year cell. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and a 
set of state-year controls and state-specific linear time trends. Data on cesarean delivery and associated risk factors 
is from the 1979–2005 NHDS files.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Average Neonatal Outcomes.—In panel A of Table 9, I estimate the association 
between national-standard laws and the percentage absolute deviation between 
state and national means for several neonatal outcome measures from the National 
Vital Statistics files (e.g., mean Apgar scores). I find no evidence to suggest that 
the convergence in cesarean rates is accompanied by corresponding convergence in 
neonatal outcomes (if anything, the confidence bounds suggests some divergence) 
and thus no evidence to suggest that changes in the intensity of cesarean utilization 
generally lead to corresponding changes in neonatal health.33 This implication is 
consistent with the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates presented in panel A of 
Table C2 in online Appendix C. Drawing on an arguably exogenous source of varia-
tions in cesarean rates, these findings, in connection with the triage results, lend 
support to a story of “flat-of-the-curve” medicine, in which additional care within 
regions generates little additional gains.
Moreover, panels B and C of Table C2, which estimate the OLS specification 
separately for initially high cesarean states and initially low states, present no sub-
stantial evidence to suggest that increases in cesarean intensities have differential 
effects at each end of the cesarean distribution. In connection with the triage find-
ings in Table 8, these findings imply that both the increase in cesarean rates in some 
states following national-standard adoptions and the decrease in other states may 
not be associated with changes in prevailing neonatal health measures (though the 
33 Considering the means of the respective dependent variables (as reported in Table 1), the point estimates in 
columns 2, 4, and 6 suggest a widening of the gap between state and national outcomes of roughly 35 percent, 
9 percent, and 20 percent, respectively.
Table 8—Relationship between National-Standard Law Adoptions and Predicted Cesarean 
Probabilities (among sample of individual cesarean deliveries)
States with 
below-average 
rates
States with 
above-average 
rates
Entire sample of states
(above and below 
average rates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
National-standard (NS) 
 law dummy
−2.79
(2.01)
6.82*
(3.38)
5.97
(3.21)
— —
NS law × below average 
 state
— — −8.98**
(3.48)
— —
Modified NS law 
 dummy
— — — −3.77**
(1.60)
−4.03***
(1.43)
Modified NS law 
 dummy: two-year lead
— — — — 0.71
(1.69)
Observations 41,419 73,268 114,687 114,687 114,687
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects and a set of state-specific linear time trends and various individual 
and state-year controls, along with controls for the average state-year incidence rates (out of the full delivery sam-
ple) for each of the individual risk factors used in the PPC calculation. The regression in column 3 also includes a 
separate dummy variable indicating whether the state has an initially below-average cesarean rate (coefficient omit-
ted). Cesarean data is from the 1979–2005 NHDS files.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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triage findings are weaker in the low-intensity end of the cesarean distribution). 
Considering that cesareans are generally costlier than vaginal deliveries (Russo, 
Weir, and Steiner 2006), national-standard adoptions may thus lead to both welfare 
losses in some regions and welfare gains in others.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
The divergent regional pathways that we have long observed in medical practices 
took root during periods of time in which medical liability rules, by their very terms, 
encouraged the maintenance of local customs. By demonstrating that physician 
practices converged regionally when states abandoned such rules, the above findings 
suggest that the law may have indeed facilitated the proliferation of divergent prac-
tices. In addition to shedding light on an historical puzzle, the analysis suggests that 
even greater standardization in medical liability law may lead to yet further reduc-
tions in practice disparities. Of course, if optimal treatment rates do indeed lie closer 
to the low-intensity end of the utilization distribution, greater welfare gains may be 
achieved if those laws pushing for greater uniformity in practices are coupled with 
additional reforms aimed at reducing general over-utilization tendencies.
The above analysis also offers a perhaps more fundamental contribution by dem-
onstrating the empirical relevancy of malpractice standard laws. The literature to 
date has focused largely on exploring the relationship between practice intensities 
and variations in the underlying level of malpractice pressure. Under these tradi-
tional investigations, it is unclear whether liability pressure causes physicians to 
alter their practices in a more general, unguided sense or whether it causes physi-
cians to more strongly adhere to specific clinical standards expected of them under 
the law. The present study allows for an investigation into responses of this latter 
type by focusing more directly on the structure of liability rules. The findings are 
perhaps encouraging in demonstrating that the law holds the potential to deter par-
ticular clinical practices. They are perhaps discouraging, however, in suggesting that 
the law may impose a source of friction on medical practice innovations, insofar 
Table 9—Relationship between National-Standard Laws and the Percentage Absolute Deviation 
between State and National Mean Neonatal Health Outcomes
Five-minute Apgar 
scores
“Good” five-minute 
Apgar scores
28-day neonatal
mortality rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient of national-standard
 law dummy
0.24
(0.15)
0.29**
(0.13)
0.08**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04) −1.15(3.49)
3.28
(3.71)
Controls and state-specific 
 linear trends?
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,257 1,237 1,257 1,237 1,344 1,317
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. All 
regressions included state and year fixed effects and are weighted by the number of deliveries associated with each 
state-year cell. Data on Apgar scores is from the 1978–2004 Natality Detail Files. Data on neonatal deaths is from 
the 1989–2004 Vital Statistics Mortality records.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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as the findings may imply that liability rules based on custom have “bite” and thus 
discourage deviations from custom.
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